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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Terry R. Smith's 
motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Soda Springs Police Officer Tyler Scheierman conducted a traffic stop of 
Smith's jeep for speeding on Highway 30. (Tr., p.4, Ls.7-12; p.8, L.16 - p.g. L.2.) 
Officer Scheierman approached the passenger side of Smith's jeep and knocked 
on the vehicle's window. (R., p.75; Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.) Smith rolled his window 
down six to seven inches. (R., p.75.) Officer Scheierman requested that Smith 
roll down the window all the way, and Smith complied. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-13.) 
Officer Scheierman informed Smith that he had observed him speeding, 
and instructed Smith to present his license, registration, and proof of insurance. 
(Tr., p.10, L.14 - p.11, L.1.) Officer Scheierman noticed the vehicle contained 
several maps in the glove compartment and center console, so he inquired about 
Smith's travels. (R., pp.76-79; Tr., p.11, Ls.7-10; p.13, Ls.1-3.) Smith hesitated, 
looked at the floor, and stated that he was on vacation and visiting friends in 
several different states. (R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.8.) Officer 
Scheierman observed that the jeep had a "lived in" appearance and that there did 
not appear to be a sufficient amount of luggage for Smith to be on vacation. (R., 
pp.80-81; Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13, L.3.) This initial contact at Smith's vehicle lasted 
approximately five to seven minutes, including the time it took Smith to retrieve 
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his driver's license and relevant documents. (R., pp.80-81; Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4; 
p.34, L.15 - p.35, L.6.) 
Officer Scheierman then returned to his patrol vehicle where he ran a 
state warrant check on his in-car computer and requested backup through 
dispatch. (R., p.82; Tr., p.13, L.12 - p.14, L.24.) Approximately one minute later, 
the check completed and revealed no outstanding warrants. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-20; 
p.39, Ls.7-9.) Officer Scheierman then initiated a "nationwide check" through 
dispatch to check for any national criminal warrants or driver's license 
suspensions - a check he performs during every traffic stop. (R., p.83; Tr., p.13, 
Ls.16-20.) This "nationwide check" typically takes approximately five minutes to 
complete. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-24.) 
While the "nationwide check" was being processed by dispatch, Officer 
Scheierman left his patrol vehicle and asked Smith to exit his jeep. (Tr., p.16, 
Ls.4-5.) Officer Scheierman then resumed his inquiries about Smith's travels. 
(Tr., p.16, Ls.8-14.) Smith again "had to think about it," and stated that he was 
visiting friends in Utah and Nevada, but was evasive and could not provide either 
the names of the friends he claimed to be visiting or any specific places he had 
been. (R., pp.84-85; Tr., p.16, Ls.10-14.) At this time, Officer Scheierman 
noticed that Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," which he recognized as 
a common indicator of marijuana use. (R., p.85; Tr., p.16, Ls.14-20.) Officer 
Scheierman then asked Smith if he used marijuana, and Smith acknowledged 
that he possessed a Colorado medical marijuana card and ingested marijuana 
through food. (Tr., p.17, L.9 - p.18, L.1.) Officer Scheierman could not recall if 
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Smith told him when he last ingested marijuana. (Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.1.) 
Smith then declined Officer Scheierman's request to search his vehicle. (R, 
pp.86-87; Tr., p.18, Ls.9-14.) 
As Officer Scheierman returned to his patrol car, the results of the 
"nationwide check" came back through dispatch and revealed no outstanding 
warrants or driver's license suspensions. (R., pp.87, 95-96; Tr., p.23, Ls.3-13; 
p.30, Ls.6-10.) Officer Scheierman then retrieved his drug-sniffing dog from his 
patrol vehicle and returned to Smith's jeep. (Tr., p.18, Ls.15-19.) Almost 
immediately after deployment, the dog alerted on the rear of Smith's jeep. (R, 
p.99; Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.25, L.23.) Officer Scheierman then searched Smith's 
vehicle and recovered approximately eight pounds of marijuana. (R, p.89; Tr., 
p.25, L.10 - p.26, L.17.) The entire traffic stop lasted approximately 15 minutes, 
and concluded when Officer Scheierman arrested Smith. (R, p.91; Tr., p.28, 
Ls.13-18.) 
The state charged Smith with marijuana trafficking. (R., p.26.) Smith filed 
a motion to suppress the evidence found in his jeep,1 contending that Officer 
Scheierman unlawfully extended the traffic stop beyond its original purpose. (R, 
ppAO-50.) After a hearing, the district court made relevant factual findings 
consistent with the facts described above, and granted Smith's motion. (R, 
pp.148-168; see generally Tr.) The state timely appealed. (R, pp.174-177.) 
1 Smith entitled his motion, "motion to dismiss," but the district court construed it 
as a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from Smith's jeep. (R., p.148, 
n.1.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by applying a subjective test to determine whether 
the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly extend his traffic stop of 
Smith to utilize a drug sniffing dog? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Applying A Subjective Test To Determine Whether 
The Arresting Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend His Traffic 
Stop Of Smith To Utilize A Drug Sniffing Dog 
A. Introduction 
The district court recognized that by the time Officer Scheierman briefly 
extended his traffic stop of Smith to deploy his drug sniffing dog, he had 
reasonable suspicion to do so. (R., pp.156-157.) However, the district court still 
granted Smith's motion to suppress, holding that Officer Scheierman incorrectly 
believed that he had already obtained reasonable suspicion at a point much 
earlier in the traffic stop. (R., pp.148-168.) The district court's reliance on Officer 
Scheierman's subjective beliefs about his reasonable suspicion constituted error. 
The district court thus erred in granting Smith's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, 
the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 
Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial 
court's application of constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable 
suspicion, in light of the facts found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207,207 P.3d at 183 
(citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)); State v. 
Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,127,233 P.3d 52,58 (2010). 
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C. The Arresting Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend The 
Traffic Stop To Deploy The Drug Sniffing Dog 
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894,896,821 P.2d 949,951 (1991). Such an investigative detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of a 
stop. State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995). 
Because a routine vehicle traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it 
is analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles 
set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 
2003). 
While a significant delay is unreasonable, officers have limited discretion 
to conduct brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop. State v. Parkinson 
135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000). For example, an officer 
conducting a legal traffic stop may permissibly ask for consent to search the 
vehicle while the driver is still detained, when that request only momentarily 
extends the stop. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-53, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct. 
App. 2000). An officer may also ask the driver for his license and registration, 
request that the driver exit his vehicle, and ask the driver about his destination 
and purpose on the road. Parkinson 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307; State v. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,496,198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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A detention becomes unreasonable if an officer significantly extends the 
duration of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 
983-984, 88 P 3d at 1223-1224. However, the purpose of a stop, and the length 
of the stop to effectuate its purpose, is not necessarily fixed at the time of 
initiation. See,~, State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 
(Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the vehicular stop began as one to investigate the 
operation of an unregistered automobile, information quickly developed which 
justified expansion of the detention to investigate a possible drug offense."). 
Thus, a routine traffic stop may be lawfully extended to deploy a drug sniffing dog 
where, during the stop, the officer acquires reasonable suspicion that the driver 
of the vehicle possesses drugs. 19..:.; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d 128 
at 135. 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate 
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify 
the suspicion that the person is or has been involved in criminal activity. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129 
Idaho 426,430,925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is 
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 
821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. 
State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they 
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 
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917,42 P.3d at 710. The presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective test 
that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes. 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998»; see also Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996). 
Smith did not challenge Officer Scheierman's basis for the initial traffic 
stop (see R., pp.42-49, 156), and the district court properly concluded that 
neither Officer Scheierman's general inquiries about Smith's travels, nor his 
request for Smith to exit the vehicle unlawfully extended the traffic stop beyond 
its original purpose (R., pp.159; 162 n.15). The district court also recognized 
that prior to the return of the "nationwide check" through dispatch, at the point 
Scheierman observed that Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," "there is 
little doubt that Scheierman had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, marijuana or other illegal substances being used while Smith was 
operating a motor vehicle." (R., pp.156-157.) The district court further noted that 
"[fJrom that point forward, the [c]ourt is convinced that Scheierman's conduct was 
rooted in facts that would support articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
sufficient to render his subsequent conduct both reasonable and constitutionally 
permissible.,,2 (R., p.157.) 
Despite concluding that Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion that 
Smith was engaged in drug activity prior to briefly extending the traffic stop to 
2 The district court also recognized that a drug dog sniff of the exterior of a 
vehicle does not constitute a Fourth Amendment "search." (R., p.161 n.14 (citing 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363, 
17 P.3d at 307. 
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deploy the drug dog, the district court still granted Smith's motion to suppress 
after incorrectly applying a reasonable suspicion analysis based on Officer 
Scheirman's subjective beliefs. The district court reasoned: 
At some point [the traffic stop] morphed from a routine traffic 
stop into an investigative stop. In fact, Scheierman notes this fact 
when he testified that upon completing his initial interview of Smith 
at the passenger window of Smith's vehicle he requested 
assistance. He states as follows: 
At this point, based on my training and 
experience, I had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
criminal activity was afoot and I was going to inquire 
further. 
Therefore, based upon Scheirman's testimony one event or 
a series of events transformed this stop from a routine traffic stop to 
one where Scheierman believed he had "reasonable suspicion" to 
broaden the scope of the stop and detain Smith for reasons 
different than the initial stop. As such, it is this period of time which 
the [cJourt must analyze in determining whether or not Smith's 
Fourth Amendment Rights have been infringed upon. 
(R., pp.157-158.) 
The district court's analysis was incorrect. Officer Scheierman's 
subjective belief as to the moment he obtained reasonable suspicion is not 
determinative of the question of when he actually extended the stop beyond its 
original purpose. Though Officer Scheierman subjectively believed he had 
reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug activity after his initial contact with Smith, 
Officer Scheierman did not actually extend the traffic stop beyond its original 
purpose until he deployed the drug dog just after the "nationwide check" was 
completed. At that point, as the district court correctly recognized, Officer 
Scheierman had reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug activity. 
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The district court cited and considered State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 
112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005), a case in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that officers impermissibly extended the duration of a traffic stop to deploy a drug 
dog. (R., pp.159-162.) The district court focused on the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
concern in Aguirre that "there was no effort made to further pursue the initial 
purpose of the stop." (R., p.160 (quoting Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564, 112 P.3d at 
852).) However, in Aguirre, it was not the officer's subjective belief about 
reasonable suspicion, nor the officer's subjective pursuits regarding a drug 
investigation that compelled the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding. Instead, in 
Aguirre, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the officers actually 
abandoned the original purpose of the traffic stop. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 562-
564, 112 P.3d at 850-852. The officers in Aguirre had already contacted 
dispatch and checked for outstanding warrants and other pertinent information 
while trailing Aguirre's vehicle, before the traffic stop even occurred. kL. at 564, 
112 P.3d at 852. After the officers stopped Aguirre, they questioned him about 
the contents of his truck and deployed a drug dog, rather than make any effort to 
further pursue the initial purpose of the stop. kL. 
Unlike what happened in Aguirre, Officer Scheierman conducted 
permissible routine warrant and license checks after he pulled Smith over, and 
did not receive the results of the "nationwide check" through dispatch until just 
before he deployed the drug dog, a point by which the district court recognized 
that Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion to justify the deployment. (R., 
pp.87, 156-157; Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6; p.30, Ls.6-10.) Thus, the present case is 
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analogous to Brumfield, where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the officers 
did not unlawfully prolong a traffic stop to deploy a drug dog where the stop 
revealed reasonable suspicion of drug activity while the officers were awaiting 
information on the suspects from dispatch. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 916-917, 42 
P.3d at 709-710; see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363, 17 P.3d at 306-307 
(holding that it was permissible for an officer to question a vehicle's driver about 
drugs and weapons and to take a drug dog around the car while another officer 
was busy checking with dispatch on the driver's status and writing out a traffic 
citation). 
At the point Officer Scheierman believed he possessed reasonable 
suspicion of Smith's drug activity, he had observed: (1) Smith roll his window 
down only six to seven inches, an act Officer Scheierman testified was consistent 
with someone trying to conceal contraband, or a particular smell (R., p.75; Tr., 
p.i0, Ls.6-S); (2) Smith hesitate, look at the floor of his vehicle, and give evasive 
answers when asked about his travels in a manner Officer Scheierman described 
as unusual for a routine traffic stop (R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.S); (3) 
the vehicle's "lived in" appearance (garbage, food wrappers, and a cooler of 
food), which Officer Scheierman testified was consistent with someone who was 
reluctant to stop and pull off the main roads while traveling in order to mitigate 
the risk of making contact with law enforcement (R., p.S1; Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13, 
L.3); and (4) the small amount of luggage in the vehicle was inconsistent with 
Smith's story that he was traveling on vacation through several states (R., p.SO; 
Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13, L.3). Because Officer Scheierman testified that he believed 
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he had reasonable suspicion that Smith was engaged in criminal activity by this 
point, the district court considered only that information in its reasonable 
suspicion analysis. (R., pp.157 -162.) This limited view of reasonable suspicion 
was erroneous because the correct analysis requires consideration of the totality 
of the circumstances at the time the stop was extended beyond its original 
purpose. 
The totality of the circumstances existing when Officer Scheierman was 
awaiting the "nationwide check," which was related to the purpose of the original 
stop, included: (1) Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," consistent with 
marijuana use (R., p.85; Tr., p.16, Ls.14-20); (2) Smith's admission that he 
possessed a medical marijuana card and ingested marijuana through foods (R., 
pp.85-86; Tr., p.17, Ls.9-22); and (3) Smith's continued evasiveness when 
discussing his travels, and being unable to name any of the friends or specific 
places he claimed to be visiting (R., pp.84-85; Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14). Only after 
Officer Scheierman obtained all of this information did the results of the 
"nationwide check" come back through dispatch, and only then did Officer 
Scheierman briefly extend the traffic stop to deploy his drug dog. The district 
court should have considered the information possessed by Officer Scheierman 
at that point, when Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug 
activity. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances supports the 
conclusion, as found by the district court, that there was reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity that would permit deployment of the drug dog to 
confirm or dispel that suspicion. 
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The district court incorrectly conducted a reasonabie suspicion analysis 
based on the subjective beliefs of Officer Scheierman. Reversal and remand for 
application of the correct objective analysis is therefore appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence recovered in Smith's vehicle and to remand for 
further proceedings 
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